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It is my hope that the Court during my years of service has built a
legacy of interpreting the Constitution and federal laws to make
them responsive to the needs of the people whom they were in-
tended to benefit and protect. This legacy can and will withstand the
test of time.
* Briefing attorney for Chief Justice Phil Hardberger of the Texas Court of Appeals,
San Antonio. The author wishes to thank Professors Michael Ariens and Amy Kastely for
their comments and suggestions. My most sincere gratitude also goes to Professor Jon
Dubin, who taught me constitutional law.
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William J. Brennan, Jr.1
[W]hat would enshrine power as the governing principle of this
Court is the notion that an important constitutional decision with
plainly inadequate rational support must be left in place for the sole
reason that it once attracted five votes.
Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, Jr.'s, death in July 1997
did not signal the end of the most liberal Supreme Court jurispru-
dence in the history of the court; that end had already come. The
Warren Court era ended slowly but surely. An increasingly con-
servative population elected conservative presidents who, in turn,
placed more conservative Justices on the Court; and by the early
1980s, the more liberal Justices found themselves in the minority.
Brennan's retirement from the Court in 1990, followed by that of
his compatriot, Thurgood Marshall, a year later, signaled the com-
ing of age of a new, more conservative (although certainly no less
activist) Court. Thus, William Brennan, Jr.'s, death gives reason
for sober pause: Brennan, perhaps more than any other Justice of
his era, represented the ideals and jurisprudence of the Warren
Court era. His landmark decisions in areas ranging from voting
rights to free speech are the decisions most likely to be recited in
any list of Warren Court accomplishments.
Almost invariably joining in those decisions from the time he
ascended to the bench was Thurgood Marshall, Brennan's friend
and ally for over twenty years. From 1967, when Marshall took his
seat as Supreme Court Justice, until 1990, when Brennan vacated
his seat, the two Justices formed one of the most consistent liberal
voting blocs in the history of the Court.3 The bloc was so consis-
1. Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., to President George Bush (July 20, 1990) (an-
nouncing his retirement from the Supreme Court), in KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR
ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 280
(1993).
2. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism,
20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 872 (1980) (indicating that Marshall and Brennan voted
alike in 95% of cases over two year period); e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969);
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tent, in fact, that Brennan's clerks often referred to Marshall as
Justice Marshall-Brennan." When Marshall came to the Court, his
liberal vote provided a solid majority for Chief Justice Earl Warren
and for Justice Brennan, who had been successfully pursuing an
agenda of liberal judicial activism.' After Warren resigned his post
and was replaced by Nixon appointee Earl Burger, Brennan and
Marshall continued to advance much of their liberal agenda. €
However, pursuing a liberal agenda became difficult for Brennan
and Marshall because the Court pulled more and more to the right,
and much of their earlier work was undone or interpreted nar-
rowly.7 By the time Brennan stepped down, pleading ill health, the
two Justices were writing dissents in an overwhelming majority of
Monroe v. Board of Comm's, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443
(1968); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 222 (1993) (commenting on reference to Mar-
shall as Marshall-Brennan). This reference to Marshall as Marshall-Brennan may have
been a slight to Marshall, who had an undeserved reputation on the Court as a "follower."
See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 63 (1997) (relaying Powell's concerns that Marshall
would occasionally defer to Brennan's vote especially if Marshall lacked understanding of
case). When Marshall sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Justice Henry J. Friendly wrote to Associate Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, "TM
seems easily led. I do not have the feeling that he realizes the difficulties of his job and is
burning the midnight oil in an effort to conquer them .... All this makes life fairly easy for
him, save when he is confronted with a difference of opinion, and then he tosses a coin."
Letter from Hon. Henry J. Friendly to Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 1962), in
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT 679
(1983).
5. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR
AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 279-80 (1992) (providing examples of liberal voting
bloc); see also supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (striking Texas law denying chil-
dren of undocumented immigrants education); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40
(1972) (discounting Georgia's death penalty law); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1970) (upholding order requiring school to end school segregation by
busing).
7. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989) (overruling in part
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), regarding standard of review for determining
validity of prison regulations governing sending of publication to inmates); Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (overruling in part Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
considering whether negligent act of prison official which caused unintended loss to in-
mates implicated Due Process Clause); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (overrul-
ing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), abandoning Aguilar test for determining whether
tip from informant provides probable cause for issuance of warrant).
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cases.8 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan believed that the Warren
and Burger Court precedent would withstand the test of time. 9
Justice Marshall, however, was able to predict a nearly wholesale
reversal of this precedent in areas such as constitutional criminal
procedure, First Amendment freedoms, affirmative action, and
substantive due process rights.10
In 1991, on the eve of his retirement, Marshall issued a final,
scathing dissent protesting such a reversal. 1 In Payne, the con-
servative majority overruled two recent decisions and held that evi-
dence of a crime's impact on its victim could be introduced during
the state's closing remarks at a sentencing hearing. 12 In his dissent,
Marshall criticized the majority for its premature and baseless re-
versal of Supreme Court precedent so newly established.1 3 Mar-
shall warned that under the Court's rationale for reversal, other
Warren Court and Burger Court precedent was endangered. 4
8. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 255 (1995)
(describing frequency of Brennan's and Marshall's dissents throughout 1970s and 1980s);
e.g., Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910, 914 (1989) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Hall-
strom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 22 (1989) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting);
Acara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 698 (1986); Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061, 1063
(1982) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028, 1028 (Mar-
shall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 490 (1972) (Marshall &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 87 (1971) Marshall & Bren-
nan, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 586 (1971) (Marshall & Bren-
nan, JJ., dissenting); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971) (Marshall & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 118 (1971) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 185
(1971) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508
(1970) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
9. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 282-83
(1995) (indicating that when Brennan stepped down, he claimed to be unconcerned about
Court's conservative turn).
10. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 844-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
sending "clear signal that scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for
reconsideration").
11. See id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for ignoring
doctrine of stare decisis). Payne overturned two decisions, South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 496 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
12. Id. at 826.
13. See id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (commenting, "Neither the law nor the
facts supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the last four years. Only the
personnel of this court did.").
14. See id. at 851-52 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (detailing previous cases decided by
Court that, under standards announced by Payne majority, may be subject to being over-
ruled). Of the cases Marshall listed, two have been overturned. Metro Broadcasting v.
Specifically, Marshall believed that the Court's rationale for over-
ruling precedent-that a case was decided by one vote, over "vig-
orous dissent"-would easily allow the new conservative Court to
overturn other similarly decided cases.' 5
While Marshall may have been correct that the Court's rationale
in Payne was specious and neglected to adequately respect prece-
dent,' 6 he might also have noted that the threatened decisions,
those patched together from careful compromise and concession,
carried the seeds of their own destruction. In fact, Marshall was
not afraid to comment on the instability and vulnerability of deci-
sions that Brennan had participated in or authored.17 Brennan's
uncanny ability to find compromise and to craft decisions that
could seemingly pull majorities from thin air18 has not ensured reli-
able precedent. 19 If Marshall and Brennan differed during their
tenure together on the Court, it was often because of Marshall's
perception that the majority's decision did not carry authority, that
its success at compromise would render the ruling impossible to
apply or that in compromising, the majority was limiting a right
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688 (1992). Another case mentioned by Marshall, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), is
of questionable precedential value. See Board of Education v. Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717-18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part) (criticizing Aguilar decision). Each of the three decisions was authored by
Brennan.
15. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (surmising that "scores of
established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration").
16. Marshall has been accused of hypocrisy here. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating, "It seems to me difficult for those who were in the majority in
Booth (including Marshall) to hold themselves forth as ardent apostles of stare decisis....
It was, I suggest, Booth, and not today's decision that compromised the fundamental values
underlying the doctrine of stare decisis."); MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 10 (1992) (noting
apparent contradiction between Payne decision and Marshall's career as civil rights lawyer,
when he attacked separate-but-equal precedent).
17. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 79-81 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing weaknesses in Brennan's plurality opinion).
18. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
19. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reex-
amining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 239
(predicting, "With the departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall, the role of precedent
and the doctrine of stare decisis are certain to assume central importance in coming years,
as a significantly more conservative Court confronts the increasingly inconvenient holdings
of its predecessors").
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Marshall saw as absolute.20 Generally, Marshall was more willing
to stand on principle and dissent from the majority opinion than
was Brennan, who could content himself with narrow victories
achieved on even narrower rationale.2 '
By looking at the cases in which Marshall and Brennan dif-
fered,22 this Essay will examine some of the philosophical, doctri-
nal, and personal differences between them. In addition, this Essay
will argue that the differences in Brennan and Marshall's jurispru-
dence exemplifies what Mark Tushnet has called the "dilemmas of
liberalism. ' 23 Inasmuch as liberal constitutionalists believe in the
judiciary's power to amend or overrule legislative action, and be-
cause they are often willing to paint with an extremely broad
brush, they can encounter two main problems. The first problem
stems from the nature of politics. Presidents do not generally ap-
point and Congress is not likely to confirm Justices who proclaim
their rights to sit as platonic guardians over legislatures and
states.24 Indeed, Brennan was appointed to the Court because
President Eisenhower believed him to be conservative or at least
moderate in his views. Thus, the Court is rarely comprised of a
majority of judicial activists as it was at the end of the Warren-
Court era.
20. See infra notes 205-37 and accompanying text.
21. This statement should not obscure the truth of Brennan's voting pattern. Known
for his ability to conciliate and compromise during the Warren and Burger eras, Brennan
could not usually play such a role on the Rehnquist Court and, like Marshall, often re-
sorted to dissent. See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
427, 427 (1986) (distinguishing Brennan's first term on Court from his previous term).
Thus, this Essay does not claim that any described differences between Brennan and Mar-
shall challenge their reputations as liberal Justices.
22. That is, cases in which either Justice dissented to the other's written opinion or
cases in which the Justices wrote separate concurring opinions or dissenting opinions that
display substantively differing rationales.
23. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 411, 413-14 (1981) (identifying problem with liberalism as necessitating system of
checks and balances to avoid tyranny by one political branch thereby blurring lines be-
tween governing branches such that "willful judges ... can do whatever they want.").
24. See R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.
121, 147-48 (1994) (observing that confirmation process generally ensures that Justices
with extreme political views will not sit on Court).
25. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 90-91 (1993) (noting that white house staff did
not research Brennan's background thoroughly and stating that Eisenhower administration
was unaware of Brennan's liberal opinions in criminal cases).
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The second difficulty facing a judicial activist on the Court is a
lack of authority. An originalist can look to the history of the Con-
stitution, to eighteenth-century dictionaries and to social encyclo-
pedias for judicial authority. A textualist can go to his or her
pocket Constitution to discern the law. By contrast, activists, par-
ticularly liberal activists, must be more ingenious. They must rely
on less certain tools, such as abstract principles, natural law theory,
or community consensus. Brennan and Marshall, activists, rejected
both originalist and textualist approaches to constitutional deci-
sion-making and argued instead for standards that evolved and
were reinvented for and by each generation.26
As an activist with broad, liberal objectives, Brennan had an-
other tool available to him-the ability to find middle ground.27
Marshall did not share this gift, and his dissents, no matter how
eloquent, could not make law.28 Yet, Marshall's expressed fears
about the weaknesses of Brennan's decisions have, in many cases,
turned out to be well-founded. Neither Brennan's knack for com-
promise nor Marshall's strict adherence to principal could with-
stand the conservative wave that followed the Warren Court. In
the end, the two Justices left a legacy of some of the most expan-
sive and profound declarations of individual freedom.29 Whether
this legacy will be an enduring one is a matter of increasing
uncertainty.3 °
26. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 16 (1988) (stating that, in interpreting the Constitution, Justices must
draw on experiences as inhabitants of current age); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the
Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (positing that
contemporary standards invoke concepts that are very different from those that Framers
endeavored to construct two hundred years ago).
27. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
28. See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2124
(1992) (observing that Marshall's talents did not include consensus building).
29. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978) (addressing right to marry);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (asserting unmarried persons' right to obtain
birth control); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (establishing right to possess
obscene materials in home); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962) (reviewing voting
rights issue).
30. See PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 36-37 (1968) (contending that doctri-
naire thinking is dangerous because it leads to decisions that are easily reversed and do not
maintain popular respect). An activist need not be a liberal, but the focus of this Essay is
on two strongly liberal Justices. In this Essay, a liberal Justice is one with a high regard and
concern for the rights of individuals vis-a-vis the state, especially in such areas as privacy,
personal autonomy, and law enforcement. In this Essay, activist refers to a Justice willing
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II. Two PATHS TO THE SUPREME COURT
In some ways, the backgrounds of Brennan and Marshall were
not as different as one might expect. As young men, both
worked.3' Brennan's father, a stern adherent to the work ethic,
was a labor organizer, and both of Marshall's parents worked.32 In
addition, both Justices could identify with discrimination and op-
pression. Brennan was acutely aware of his joint disabilities as an
Irishman and a Catholic. 33 Marshall grew up in segregated Balti-
more, and while his family was considered middle-class, he did not
escape the discrimination that plagued African-Americans during
his youth.34
These similarities, however, cannot disguise the differences be-
tween the two men. The difference of color, with its attendant cul-
tural experiences, is of course vast and can account for immense
differences in ideology and outlook. In addition, the future co-Jus-
tices followed different career paths. Marshall took the path of an
ardent and committed advocate of goals in which he fervently be-
lieved, while Brennan took a somewhat less impassioned path of
private practice and state-court judiciary.
to oppose the will of the people as expressed by legislative action, in order to further a
desired goal or policy.
31. HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 16 (1995)
(noting that by age eleven, Brennan worked every type of job possible); MICHAEL D. DA-
vis & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL, WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE
BENCH 40-41 (1992) (noting Marshall's early jobs delivering hats and as waiter).
32. See RANDALL E. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW: THE LEGAL CA-
REER OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL chs. 1-4 (1973) (discussing early life of Marshall
and indicating that Marshall's father worked as Pullman-car waiter and amateur writer
while Marshall's mother taught school), reprinted in ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN,
THURGOOD MARSHALL, JUSTICE FOR ALL 22, 23 (1992); KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE
FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA
18-19 (1993) (discussing career of William J. Brennan, Sr.); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 8
(1994) (detailing early life of Thurgood Marshall).
33. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 32 (1993) (noting Brennan's status as Irish
Catholic made it difficult for him to find employment as young man).
34. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WAR-
RIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 41 (1992) (relating that, at times, Marshall could
find no public restrooms for African-Americans).
35. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 32-41, 68-85 (1993) (chronicling Brennan's un-
eventful career as young lawyer and his career as New Jersey judge); Juan Williams, Mar-
shall's Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990, at W1 (recalling Marshall's fervor in study of law
[Vol. 29:1
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A. William I. Brennan, Jr.: Ike's Second Mistake3 6
Brennan grew up in Newark, New Jersey, the son of labor orga-
nizer William Brennan, Sr., and Agnes Brennan, both immigrants
to this country from Ireland.37 After an undistinguished childhood
and youth, Brennan attended the University of Pennsylvania and
eventually graduated from Harvard Law School.38 While his law
school career was marked with minor achievements, Brennan
showed no signs that he would become one of the most influential
Supreme Court Justices in the Court's history. 39 Later, upon Bren-
nan's appointment to the Supreme Court, those colleagues who
could remember him recalled that he was able, affable, and a "pro-
digious notetaker."4 °
When Brennan attended Harvard Law School, his future co-Jus-
tice on the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter, sat on the faculty.4
Frankfurter, a political liberal by the standards of the day, was part
of a large movement that argued for judicial restraint4 2 in decision-
making in the wake of Lochner v. New York.43 This movement,
like Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in Lochner, supported the no-
tion that it was the judiciary's responsibility to simply apply the law
to a given set of facts rather than to overturn legislative enact-
and future legal victories that earned him name of "Mr. Civil Rights"), in ROGER
GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL, JUSTICE FOR ALL 26-27 (1992).
36. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 158 (1993) (quoting tradition that President
Eisenhower called his appointment of Brennan to Supreme Court his second mistake as
president, with first being his appointment of Chief Justice Warren).
37. See id. at 18-20 (describing Brennan's early childhood).
38. See id. at 27-30 (noting that Brennan was influenced to attend University of Penn-
sylvania and Harvard Law School by his father).
39. See id. at 28 (stating that Brennan was of "remarkably average intelligence").
40. See id. (pronouncing Brennan to have been hard-working, friendly individual who
studied intensively).
41. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 29 (1993) (revealing that Frankfurter was
Brennan's public utilities instructor and noting that Brennan was not Frankfurter's "prize
pupil.").
42. See id. at 11-12 (calling Frankfurter "the model of judicial restraint"); see also
Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas,
and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988
DUKE L.J. 71, 95 (observing that Frankfurter was not social conservative, yet he failed to
distinguish between protecting economic rights and protecting more vulnerable individual
rights).
43. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ments. 44 On the Court, Brennan would find himself directly op-
posed to the idea of judicial restraint, especially as propounded by
his former professor at Harvard, Felix Frankfurter.45 Ironically,
those who remember Brennan at Harvard note that he was not
interested in legal theory or philosophy.46 Rather, as Paul Freund
noted in his complaint of Brennan's appointment to the Court,
Brennan never took a constitutional law course at Harvard. 7
After graduation, Brennan began working for a labor defense
firm in Newark, defending the kinds of groups that his father had
fought against as a labor organizer. In 1949, Brennan accepted a
seat on the New Jersey Superior Court as a trial judge and only one
year after that, in 1950, he was appointed to the New Jersey Court
of Appeals. 8 Two years later, he was appointed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court.49
Reviewing Brennan's early jurisprudence, one could not predict
that he would become one of the most liberal United States
Supreme Court Justices in the history of that body. For example,
at the appellate level, Brennan took a narrow view of the right to
privacy, 50 and on the New Jersey Supreme Court he refused to hold
that the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal trials had to
be protected by the states.5 While he was on the state supreme
court, however, shades of the later Brennan began to show. In
44. See Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating
that Constitution "is made for people ... and the accident of our finding certain opinions
familiar, or novel .. . ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution"); see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (declaring that "to the legislature no less than to courts is
committed the guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties").
45. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 168-77 (1993) (describing differences between
Frankfurter and Brennan).
46. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 23 (1995)
(noting that although Harvard emphasized legal theory, Brennan sought practicality).
47. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 94 (1993) (referencing Freund's 1956 letter to
Frankfurter stating that he had reviewed Brennan's coursework).
48. Id. at 69.
49. Id. at 78.
50. See Cortese v. Cortese, 76 A.2d 717, 721 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (holding
that mother in paternity suit could not invoke right to privacy in order to avoid taking
blood test or having blood drawn from her child).
51. In re Pillo, 93 A.2d 176, 180 (N.J. 1952).
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State v. Tune,5 2 he dissented from a holding that criminal defend-
ants had no right to inspect confessions they had made to the po-
lice.53 In State v. Fary,54 Brennan held that New Jersey must
protect a right against self-incrimination.55 In spite of these early
hints at his later jurisprudence, the young Brennan was hardly a
maverick; rather, he largely applied precedent and rarely hinted at
his personal convictions.56 This approach is apparent in a 1953
death penalty case in which Brennan upheld the conviction and
death sentence of a teen found guilty of murder. Without expres-
sing any personal compunctions against the death penalty,57 Bren-
nan simply listed the points of appeal and one by one dismissed
them, including an undenied allegation that the jury had been
given a pamphlet that had been written and authorized by the sher-
iff's office with "instructions" for proper jury deliberations.58
Upon dismissing a claim that the revised exculpatory testimony of
a codefendant (who had received a life sentence) should be the
basis for a new trial for the teen receiving the death penalty, Bren-
nan uncharacteristically wrote, "His life not being forfeit, nor could
it be, he plainly perjured himself, obviously from some twisted
sense of loyalty to his companion in depravity."'5 9
52. 98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953).
53. See Tune, 98 A.2d. at 894 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that experience has
not shown that criminal who is aware of whole case against him will procure perjured
testimony).
54. 117 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1955).
55. Fary, 117 A.2d at 501; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that
right against self-incrimination was one of fundamental rights incorporated in Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to be applied to state action).
56. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
57. Cf Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the
Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 passim (1995)
(stating that Brennan and Marshall were notorious for persistent dissents in death penalty
cases, refusing to acknowledge precedent that held death penalty was constitutional).
58. See New Jersey v. Vaszorich, 98 A.2d 299, 305 (N.J. 1953) (indicating that each
panel member was issued pamphlet entitled "Primary Instructions to Jurors"). The pam-
phlet included a quote taken from Lycurgus on its back cover, which read: "On the head of
the criminal lies the crime; but in a miscarriage of justice the jurors delinquent become
participants of guilt." Id. One Justice on the state supreme court dissented to the holding,
stating that "the comforting faith in the equality of the criminal law and its impartial ad-
ministration may well totter under the impact of the attempted distinction here made." Id.
at 318 (Wachenfeld, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 316.
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The future Justice who had not engaged in theoretical pursuits at
Harvard showed no signs of having done so as a New Jersey state
judge. Nonetheless, there was some suggestion of his liberal polit-
ical views when Brennan spoke out against the efforts of the Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities during this period;60 but as a
judge, Brennan rarely strayed from the rule of statute and prece-
dent.61 As a Supreme Court Justice, Brennan would ultimately de-
velop and attempt to describe a judicial philosophy; but in 1959,
when President Eisenhower appointed him to the Court, no such
philosophy was apparent.
Ironically, Brennan came to the attention of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration after a speech he made in Washington calling for bet-
ter and more efficient management of appellate court documents
and expressing the view that the appellate courts heard too many
cases.61 Seeking to appoint a Catholic Justice, Eisenhower acted
on the advice that Brennan, although a Democrat, believed in judi-
cial restraint and would not make waves.63
Brennan's confirmation hearings were held largely without inci-
dent, although under baiting questioning by Senator Joseph Mc-
Carthy, Brennan exhibited a weakness-an unwillingness to firmly
take a position when challenged-for which he would be criticized
60. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 109-11 (1993) (relating transcript of Brennan's
1957 confirmation hearing in which McCarthy questioned him for speaking out against
efforts of investigating committees to expose communism). Brennan spoke out against
anti-communist investigations, calling them "reminiscent of Salem witch hunts." Id. at 81;
see also WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE
HOUSE COMMITrEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 488-89 (1968) (referring to Brennan as
one of Committee's "four doughty foes").
61. See New Jersey v. Benes, 108 A.2d 846, 849 (N.J. 1954) (indicating that under New
Jersey statute, defendant is not entitled to hearing or to copy of any report from presen-
tencing mental evaluation, nor to opportunity to examine hospital staff); White v. Parole
Bd. of New Jersey, 86 A.2d 422, 425 (N.J. Sup. App. 1952) (instructing that while Parole
Board "should" provide hearing to give inmate chance to challenge evidence against him
or her in interest of fairness, such hearing is not required by statute or due process).
62. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 84-85 (1993) (relating that during conference
on court congestion Brennan spoke convincingly about court reforms that would eliminate
delays in litigation).
63. See id. at 85 (noting that Eisenhower's advisors were unfamiliar with Brennan's
dissent in Tune and viewed his remarks as illustrative of one who would not "entertain
technical arguments [but would] get to the heart of the issue").
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as a Supreme Court Justice.64 McCarthy discovered that Brennan
had criticized the tactics of the Committee on Un-American Activ-
ities in a recent speech, which McCarthy used to question Bren-
nan's loyalty to the country.65 Brennan, who acknowledged
making the speech and specifically criticizing the scare tactics used
by some of the committee members, denied having any particular
instances in mind when he made the allegations and maintained
that he had been using "artistic license. '66
B. Thurgood Marshall: The Right Man at the Right Time67
Like Brennan, Thurgood Marshall did little to distinguish him-
self as a young man. In fact, Marshall was expelled twice from col-
lege for fraternity pranks, and he did not exhibit an early passion
for civil rights issues.68
Marshall's father, perhaps seeing his son's flare for argument,
pushed him to attend law school. Marshall first applied to the Uni-
versity of Maryland, which was located in Baltimore; however, the
University of Maryland Law School did not admit African-Ameri-
cans. 69 Undaunted, Marshall applied to Howard University where
Charles Hamilton Houston, Harvard's top African-American grad-
uate, was designing and implementing a course of study that would
prepare young African-American lawyers to wage a battle against
discrimination. 70 Houston, who like Brennan had studied under
64. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
65. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 106-08
(1995) (recounting questioning of Brennan by McCarthy during confirmation hearings).
66. See id. at 106-08 (stating that Brennan made general, not specific, comments when
he made allegations about committee on Un-American Activities). When confronted by
McCarthy about his reference to "epithets hurled at hapless and helpless witnesses," Bren-
nan said he was speaking of a "general impression" that he had of how witnesses before
the committee had been treated. Id.
67. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL:
WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 266 (1992) (quoting President Johnson
upon his appointment of Marshall to Supreme Court as saying: "I believe it is the right
thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and the right place").
68. See Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990, at W12 (describing
Marshall's college years), reprinted in ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 143-44 (1992).
69. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 9 (1994) (affirming that Maryland's segregation
laws prevented Marshall from attending state university in Baltimore; thus, he entered
Howard Law School in 1930).
70. Id. at 29.
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Felix Frankfurter, shared the Legal Realists' belief that the law was
a tool that could be used for social engineering.7  Houston also
believed in drawing on resources from outside of the law to sup-
port legal arguments, such as sociology, history, and psychology.27
These ideas would become central to Marshall's efforts to end dis-
crimination as an attorney for the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People ("NAACP").
Marshall went to work for the Baltimore branch of the NAACP
shortly after graduating from Howard, and it may be for his work
as a civil rights attorney for the NAACP that he will be most
remembered. From the early 1930s, the NAACP attacked the na-
tion's discriminatory practices, carefully choosing7 3 and winning
cases that chipped away at the separate-but-equal doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson.74 Together with Charles Hamilton Houston
and a staff of talented lawyers, Marshall convinced court after
court that the challenged educational programs were not "equal"
to their white counterparts and, therefore, could not survive under
the test articulated in Plessy. Finally, in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,75 the NAACP lawyers relied upon a vast array of social sci-
ence data as well as precedent (which they had largely been
responsible for creating) to argue that separate is inherently
unequal.76
In 1961, several years after Marshall's success in Brown, Presi-
dent Kennedy appointed him to serve on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.77 Marshall's tenure there, like
71. See id. at 6 (expounding on Houston's philosophy for educating young lawyers to
attack discrimination).
72. See id. (providing that Houston drew upon sources from outside law to enable
lawyers to explain to lawmakers how rules actually function in society).
73. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WAR-
RIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 77 (1992) (revealing that Marshall purposefully
selected University of Maryland's law school for NAACP's first case challenging applica-
tion of Plessy's separate-but-equal doctrine). Marshall successfully convinced the Mary-
land Supreme Court that the university's practice of assisting African-American law school
applicants to attend out-of-state law schools did not satisfy the "equal" prong of separate-
but-equal doctrine. Id.
74. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. Id. at 495.
77. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WAR-
RIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 236 (1992) (recounting Marshall's 1961 nomina-
tion to Second Circuit). The politics of this appointment demonstrate that, in spite of the
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Brennan's in the New Jersey state courts, was unremarkable.
While he demonstrated somewhat liberal leanings-holding, for
example, that New York's law requiring state university faculty
members to sign loyalty oaths was unconstitutional 78-he was not
the fiery dissenter he would later become. In fact, in four years on
the court, he wrote only twelve dissents.79
In 1965, President Johnson appointed Marshall to the position of
Solicitor General. 80 In that role, Marshall was in a position to ad-
vocate strict enforcement of the new civil rights acts of 1957, 1960
and 1964, which were being tested in the south.81 His first case
before the Supreme Court was United States v. Price82 in which the
government argued that acts of racial terrorism should be made
wealth of liberal self-congratulation that marked the sixties, the situation of African-Amer-
icans had not much improved. When Marshall approached Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy about a judicial appointment, Kennedy told him flatly that he could not have a seat
on the appellate bench but offered him a district court judgeship. Id. at 223. When Mar-
shall insisted on having a seat on the appellate court, the Kennedys knew there would be
resistance to the appointment of an African-American judge to such a high seat because
only one other African-American had ever sat on the appellate bench. Id. A deal was
negotiated with Mississippi Senator James 0. Eastland, who was vehemently opposed to
the civil rights movement. Id. at 235-36. President Kennedy agreed to appoint Eastland's
college roommate, Harold Cox, to a district judgeship in the South in return for Eastland's
cooperation by allowing Marshall's appointment to go to a full committee vote. Id. at 236.
Eastland is reported to have sent a message to President Kennedy through Robert Ken-
nedy: "Tell your brother that if he will give me Harold Cox, I will give him the nigger." Id.
But see Richard L. Revesz, Thurgood Marshall's Struggle, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 259 n.136
(1993) (questioning accuracy of this account).
78. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965) (concluding
that constitutional protections against discriminatory or arbitrary laws extend to pubic em-
ployees). Marshall's ruling was later upheld by the Supreme Court, with Justice Brennan
authoring the opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
79. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WAR-
RIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 240 (1992) (indicating that Marshall wrote 98
majority opinions, 8 concurrences, and 12 dissents while he sat on Second Circuit Court).
80. See id. at 244-55 (discussing nomination and appointment of Marshall in 1965 to
replace Archibald Cox as Solicitor General).
81. See id. at 245-47 (describing role of Solicitor General in arguing government's
cases and noting that civil rights acts "were only as strong as the government's will to
enforce them"). As Solicitor General, Marshall argued several cases on behalf of the gov-
ernment that eventually went before the Supreme Court. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (affirming validity of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 under com-
merce power); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(finding Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be valid exercise of Congress's power under
Commerce Clause).
82. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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federal crimes.83 Marshall served less than two years as Solicitor
General before Johnson appointed him to the Supreme Court to
replace Associate Justice Tom Clark.84  The much-anticipated
choice was met with general approval.85 Nonetheless, the last leg
of Marshall's path to the Court-his confirmation-was difficult.
At the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mar-
shall was remarkably frank. For example, he refused to agree with
Senator Sam Ervin that the role of the Supreme Court was simply
to give effect to the intentions of the Constitution's Framers.86 In-
stead, Marshall stated his unwavering belief that the Constitution is
a living document. 87 Furthermore, Marshall disagreed that both
his and the Supreme Court's recent expansive reading of personal
liberties amounted to injecting personal views into constitutional
interpretation.88 Additionally, in the area of criminal procedure,
83. See Price, 383 U.S. at 788-89 (arguing that civil rights statutes made act of racial
terrorism criminal conduct); see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967)
(striking California law authorizing housing discrimination); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding congressional authority to ban literacy tests that had signif-
icant impact on minorities); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966) (upholding
federal law criminalizing discrimination); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966) (concluding that voting district lines may not be drawn in discriminatory fash-
ion); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (finding that cities, like states, cannot
enforce private discrimination).
84. See MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WAR-
RIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 263-76 (1992) (discussing nomination and ap-
pointment of Marshall to Supreme Court).
85. See id. at 264 (writing that Marshall's appointment was praised by Earl Warren,
Tom C. Clark, and Ramsey Clark). A notable exception was the reaction of Representa-
tive John Rarick who said, "[T]he poor, persecuted, occupied southland, the heel of the
judicial compulsion and forced to destroy their school systems this Fall is now compounded
by the additional insult of having the agent who was used to foment the trouble now pub-
licly lauded for his race-mixing." Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Mar-
shall to the United States Supreme Court, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 27, 31 (1989).
86. See Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the United States
Supreme Court, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 27, 34 (1989) (agreeing generally with Ervin's
assertion but insisting that Court's role required more because Constitution is living
document).
87. See id. at 34 (responding that Constitution was "meant to be a living document").
88. See id. at 36 (confirming Marshall's sharp disagreement with Ervin's accusation).
Marshall stated, "It is ... understood that [Supreme Court Justices] shall not use their
personal views, and indeed, they take an oath not to." Id. at n.91. Of course, the debate
about whether a Justice injects his or her personal views into constitutional interpretation
is an old one, and allegations that a given Justice has done so are launched from both sides
of the political fence. The more relevant question is why that Justice injects one set of
views and why a different Justice injects another. This question suggests the presence of
cultural, psychological and economic forces that inevitably shape any jurist's reading of the
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which occupied much of the hearings, Marshall disagreed that the
nation's security was at that time endangered by crime8 9 and re-
fused to concede that the Fifth Amendment's proscription against
the use of involuntary confessions applied only to impelled confes-
sions.90 Despite his refusal to make concessions in this area and in
law. Such forces render meaningless the question of whether jurists "should" inject per-
sonal views into the Constitution. For example, during Senator Ervin's questioning of
Marshall, the men discussed the Second Circuit case of Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731 (2d
Cir. 1965), in which Marshall had participated. Id. at 36. Although vacated by an en banc
court, Marshall's initial view in Stovall had been that a criminal suspect was entitled to
have an attorney present for an in-custody eyewitness identification. Id. Ervin accused
Marshall and the Supreme Court of finding a right in the Sixth Amendment that had not
existed before. See Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the
United States Supreme Court, 6 HARV. BLACKLE-rER J. 27, 36 (1989) (criticizing decisions
granting right to counsel during eyewitness identification that were later overturned); see
also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967) (declaring that in-court identifications
may not be tainted by illegal lineup procedures); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237
(1967) (stating that post-indictment lineup is "critical stage" of prosecution, at which pres-
ence of attorney is required). Marshall responded, "We did not write anything into the
Sixth Amendment. We applied the law of the land . . . that when a man reached ...
arraignment, he was entitled to a lawyer. He reached the stage, he did not have a lawyer.
So any identification question ... should be withheld until he gets a lawyer." Linda S.
Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the United State's Supreme Court, 6
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 27, 36-37 (1989). The difference between Marshall and Ervin was
not merely what they believed about the rights of criminal defendants but how they indi-
vidually read the Constitution. It is customary but wrong to assume that because Ervin is
relying on the specific words of the provision, his position is more correct and that Mar-
shall is simply interjecting his own beliefs. Marshall's tendency to read the Constitution for
broad, libertarian principles is formally equivalent to Ervin's tendency to read it for nar-
row, specific rules of law. If Marshall's belief is that the Constitution protects the individ-
ual from rampant governmental power, Ervin's position is that it protects innocent citizens
from guilty citizens. In other words, the emotional thrust of Ervin's argument is not that
the Constitution has been misinterpreted, but that criminals are being set free. See id. at 37
n.106 (recounting decisions of Court criticized by Ervin as examples of constitutional mis-
interpretation that allowed criminal to go free); see also Stephen Macedo, Morality and the
Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 29, 35
(1992) (arguing that insistence on separating what law "is" from what it ought to be is not
self-evident but simply theory of interpreting law).
89. See Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967) (statement of Thurgood Mar-
shall, nominee for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of United States) (stating that
even when security and welfare of all citizens is endangered, citizens cannot be required to
sacrifice constitutional rights), reprinted in 7 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATION OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1972 (1975).
90. See Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the United States
Supreme Court, 6 HARV. BLACKLETI-ER J. 27, 34-35 (1989) (presenting Marshall's argu-
ment that Fifth Amendment did not prohibit use of unrepresented defendants' voluntary
statements and problem was determining whether statements are voluntary).
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others, and in spite of considerable contention over the legitimacy
of civil rights legislation, 91 Marshall's nomination was approved by
an 11-5 vote.92 After spirited debate, the Senate confirmed Mar-
shall by a 69-11 vote.93 Shortly thereafter, Marshall took his seat
on the Court as the first African-American in the history of the
country to assume so high a post and, in addition, solidified an al-
ready powerful liberal voting bloc.94
III. A THEORY BY ANY OTHER NAME, OR A WORD
ABOUT PHILOSOPHY
Labeling in judicial philosophy is problematic because those who
engage in this act so often conceal presumed standards. In spite of
this difficulty, labeling is inescapable because one must label in or-
der to engage in current intellectual discourse about the Court.
However, labels must be useful and must tell us something about
the Justice under consideration in order to understand that Justice.
In this regard, a label like "results oriented, ' 95 so often applied to
Justices Brennan and Marshall, is of little use because the desire
for strict adherence to the law or for deference to the legislative
91. See id. at 37-39 (discussing dialogue between Marshall and Strom Thurmond con-
cerning constitutional amendments serving as foundation for civil rights legislation). This
lively debate was initiated by Senator Strom Thurmond, whose questioning of Marshall on
the precepts and history of the post-Civil War amendments sounded something like a Jim
Crow poll test. See id. at 48 (indicating that Thurmond's intent for questions to have that
effect became apparent at full Senate debate on Marshall's nomination when he offered
Marshall's inability to answer many questions as grounds for voting against appointment).
92. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 27 (1997) (discussing Marshall's nomination and
appointment to Supreme Court and noting that all negative votes were cast by Southern
Democrats).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 28 (stating, "With Marshall, the Court had a solid bloc of five liberal
justices" including Brennan, Warren, Douglas, and Fortas); see also Russell W. Galloway,
Jr., The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-1969), 20 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 773 passim (1980) (providing extensive overview of Supreme Court's vot-
ing patterns between 1961 and 1968, "a period in which liberal activists exercised almost
complete control over the Court's decisions."); e.g. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969); Green v. County Sch. Bd. 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
95. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 163 (1993) (describing criticism of Brennan's
decisions as "results oriented").
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enactment being reviewed is a desire for results.96 A discussion
about what results any Justice desires and why he or she desires it
will be fruitful, as will a discussion about how that Justice works
toward a desired end, whether it be an egalitarian society or strict
adherence to the rule of law. However, an argument that a given
Justice works toward desired ends while another merely applies the
law with no regard to the outcome is absurd.
Instead, this Essay will focus on two questions that are basic to a
determination and understanding of judicial theory and decision-
making.97 The first question asks what a Justice believes is the con-
stitutionally approved role of the judiciary. This question requires
an examination of the Justices' beliefs about the relationship be-
tween a legislature chosen by a majority of voters and an unelected
judiciary. The second question asks where a Justice looks to find
"the law." These distinct questions can be confused98 and blur the
vision, making two Justices, Marshall and Brennan, appear to be
one. Upon separate examinations of these questions, it is apparent
that Brennan and Marshall shared the same view with regard to the
role of the judiciary, but sometimes diverged as to the source of the
law.
96. See PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: To-
WARD RESPONSIVE LAW 66-67 (1978) (arguing that jurisprudence more concerned with
legitimacy of system emphasizes procedural fairness over substantive rights). But see Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412-14 (1989) (including opinion by Justice Kennedy that despite
reverence for American flag, burning it is not unconstitutional). One might argue that
because Justice Kennedy obviously reached a conclusion that was personally repugnant to
him, his decision and others like it are not "results oriented." It is more likely that Justice
Kennedy's conclusions in Johnson led to the only result that he could live with given his
notions about the Constitution and the law. Thus, he was able to say, "The hard fact is that
sometimes we must make decisions that we do not like. We make them because they are
right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result." Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added). Clearly, Kennedy sometimes had to choose be-
tween competing desired results, yet this did not make his thinking less "results oriented."
97. One might inquire as to what policies or values are reflected in a judge's decisions.
This inquiry is expressed somewhat inadequately in politics and is answered with the at-
tachment of phrases such as "liberal," "conservative," "leftist," or "rightist." This question
need not be discussed at length because Marshall and Brennan were clearly left of center
on virtually every issue.
98. See R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.
121, 214-17 (1994) (generalizing that instrumentalist judges view judiciary as co-equal
branch and rely primarily on text of Constitution as source of law and referring to Brennan
and Marshall as instrumentalists).
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A. Role of the Judiciary
Throughout the history of the Court, Justices have taken differ-
ent positions regarding the proper role of the judiciary in the con-
stitutional scheme. The fundamental question is whether judges
may declare legislative acts void for failing to measure up to their
reading of the Constitution or other extra-textual standards.
We need not linger on this question for the purposes of this Es-
say because Brennan and Marshall labored in the activist tradi-
tion.99 Brennan and Marshall read the rule of Marbury v.
Madisona00 expansively and believed that it was the judiciary's job
to overturn invalid legislative acts."'1 In fact, both had a significant
role in Cooper v. Aaron,10 2 a decision that resoundingly affirmed
Marbury. As NAACP counsel, Marshall argued the case, insisting
that the Supreme Court had the authority to compel Arkansas to
comply with the mandate of Brown v. Board of Educatibn.1 3
B. Sources of the Law
Marshall and Brennan's activist jurisprudence unmistakably re-
flected the ideas of Legal Realism, the jurisprudential model that
was predominant when they both attended law school. Roscoe
Pound, the dean of the Harvard Law School for twenty years, is
credited with the early development of this school of legal
thought.104 Legal Realism grew out of great social unrest which
was pervasive in the early part of the twentieth century-unrest
over labor conditions, rampant and irresponsible capitalism, and
99. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0.
Douglas, and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme
Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71 passim (offering Justice Felix Frankfurter as paradigmatic exam-
ple of judicial activism's antithesis, judicial restraint).
100. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
101. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MAR-
SHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 94-95 (1997) (discussing Supreme Court's
responses to state statutes which violated equal protection clause and noting that "[a] vig-
orous jurisprudence of equal protection threatened the ability of legislatures to legislate at
all.").
102. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
103. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 3-4.
104. See N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel
to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1307 (credit-
ing Pound as being originator of Legal Realism).
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government corruption. 10 5 In a 1906 speech before the American
Bar Association, Pound criticized America's lawyers and justices
for allowing society to flounder and for not responding to the pub-
lic opinion fueling the unrest.10 6 Pound argued that instead of ad-
hering to a set of abstract rules and principles, the law should be
adapted to social needs. 1 7 He proposed a pragmatic approach to
the law by advocating the adjustment of principles to the human
condition. 0 8
For Marshall and Brennan, then, both constitutional and statu-
tory law reflected broad goals and principles that should be fully
enacted. Neither Justice was content to stop with an examination
of the text of the Constitution or of a particular statute. Instead,
Brennan explicitly rejected the positivist tradition in American law
stating:
The shift must be away from finespun technicalities and abstract
rules. The vogue for positivism in jurisprudence-the obsession with
what the law is ... had to be replaced by a jurisprudence that recog-
nizes human beings as the most distinctive and important feature of
the universe which confronts our senses, and the function of law as
the historic means of guaranteeing that pre-eminence."0 9
A positivist can rely on "positive law" or law found in the legal
text to decide "hard cases." 110 A positivist may be an originalist,
105. See id. at 1307 (elaborating on origins of legal philosophy of Pound that sought
"judicial decisionmaking sensitive to currents of public opinion" and challenged methods
of writing opinions and making decisions).
106. See id. (stating that Pound's discussion "laid the woes of the law" before legisla-
tors and judges)
107. See id. at 1308 (emphasizing sociological nature of Pound's position).
108. See id. at 1309-10 (outlining five characteristics of this new study of law: (1) it
looked more to how law actually works than to abstract principles; (2) it viewed law as
institution that could be improved; (3) it stressed purpose of law over its ability to sanction;
(4) it viewed precepts more as guides than inflexible mandates; and (5) it reflected diver-
sity of philosophical ideas).
109. William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Annual Survey of American Law at New
York University Law School (Apr. 15, 1982), in Honorable Daniel J. O'Hern, Some Reflec-
tions on the Roots of the Differing Judicial Philosophies of William J. Brennan, Jr. and
Joseph Weintraub, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1994); see also Francis P. McQuade &
Alexander T. Kardos, Mr. Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy, 33 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 321, 348 (1952) (quoting Brennan as saying: "The law is not an end to itself, nor does
it provide ends; it is pre-eminently a means to serve what we think is right").
110. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7
(1990) (defining "hard cases" as those that have not been settled by precedent or applica-
ble social rule and equating positivism with classical view of natural law).
1997] ESSAY
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
who looks to the intent of the Framers to determine the law, or a
textualist, who looks only to the plain text and history of the Con-
stitution.11' In contrast, Brennan and Marshall went beyond these
texts to consider their purposes for the present as well as to deter-
mine their place in the past. As Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn
wrote, speaking of statutory interpretation:
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some
assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose
or objective, is nonsense .... [I]ncreasingly as a statute gains in age
its language is called upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncon-
templated at the time of its passage. Here, the quest is not properly
for the sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense sought
originally to be put into it, but rather for the sense which can be
quarried out of it in the light of the new situation." 2
To contend that both Brennan and Marshall recognized the in-
terpretation and application of the law as purposeful exercises,
however, is not to suggest that they did not differ in their approach
to the task. Subtle, yet important distinctions can be made be-
tween the jurisprudence of the two Justices but to understand these
distinctions, one must consider the raw materials Marshall and
Brennan brought to their interpretations of the law and the sources
they used to decide "hard cases." In other words, one must ex-
amine Brennan's confessed interest in what he called "natural law"
theory as well as Marshall's training and work as a "social
engineer."
IV. BRENNAN AND MARSHALL READING THE LAW
A. Brennan and the Natural Law
Natural law is one of the most written about and least carefully
defined terms in legal scholarship. In its purest form, it originated
in the writings of Aristotle, was adopted up by St. Thomas Aqui-
nas, and emerged in the writings of such thinkers as Locke," 3 Hob-
111. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-91 (1986) (finding no right to homo-
sexual conduct in text or history of Constitution); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding no right to education in text or history of Constitution).
112. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
113. JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE (Robert Horwitz
et al., eds., 1990).
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bes," 4 and Rousseau." 5  In addition, natural law undoubtedly
influenced the construction of the United States Declaration of In-
dependence.1 16 Natural law has two aspects: a moral prescription
for the way one lives his or her life and a set of rights to which each
person is entitled by virtue of being a human.1 17 The latter aspect
inspired the Declaration of Independence and is implicated in Jus-
tice Brennan's jurisprudence." 8
There are competing ideas about how far natural rights jurispru-
dence is, or should be, from positivism, and about what rights natu-
ral rights theory will recognize. 1" 9 For example, some theorists
argue that any consideration of natural rights must be limited to
those contemplated and adopted by the Framers. This argument
proposes that in contracting with the government, "the people" ex-
114. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
115. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, LE CONTRACT SOCIAL (1792), translated in Rous-
SEAU, POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (F. Watkins ed. & trans., 1962).
116. See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 24-79 (1942) (expounding on influence of natural law/natu-
ral rights theory on Declaration of Independence, including influence of historic thinkers
such as Locke, Rousseau, and Aquinas).
117. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS passim (1980) (discuss-
ing natural law versus natural rights theory); JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
LAW OF NATURE 98-101 (Robert Horwitz et al., eds., 1990) (distinguishing between natural
law in which individuals discover on their own what law of nature is, and natural rights, or
"the fact that we have free use of something"); see also Randy E. Barnett, Getting Norma-
tive: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY
93, 108 (1995) (highlighting distinctions between natural law and natural rights theory).
Barnett correctly notes that natural law and natural rights are two separate studies, but
because "natural law" is so often used as a catchphrase for one or both, it appears that
natural rights is a subset or "aspect" of natural law theory. Id.; See R. Randall Kelso, The
Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlightenment
Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1051, 1065-66
(1995) (tracing natural law/natural rights split to diverging lines of natural law theory: lib-
eral line traced through Enlightenment philosophy emphasizing libertarian principles, and
conservative line traced through "classic" or Christian ideology emphasizing more con-
servative values). Another scholar includes the natural rights strand as a precept of Aristo-
telian theory. See Alan Gerwith, The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an
Alternative, 29 AM. J. JURIS. 95, 95-96 (1984) (identifying three features of Aristotelian-
Thomist theory: belief that natural law is universal because it sets justifiable prescriptions
for human conduct, that it requires protection of human goods or interests that are based
on nature of human beings, that natural law is based on reason).
118. See supra note 116.
119. In the nineteenth century, for example, a list of natural rights would surely have
included the right to contract. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward
a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 390-91 (1995) (stating
that Lochner-era law assumed property and contract rights were supported by natural law).
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plicitly contracted for the government to protect specific rights.120
Under this scheme, the judiciary has little or no business deciding
what those rights are or whether "new" rights exist because the
judiciary is not part of the contract. Advocates of this version of
natural law are current Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter.121
However, any definition consistent with the origins of natural
law ideology-an ideology that recognizes rights that existed in-
dependent from and prior to government-must acknowledge a re-
sort to law that is "extra-governmental.' 1 22  Thus, a more
120. See Raoul Berger, Natural Law and Judicial Review: Reflections of an Earth-
bound Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 5, 25 (1992) (offering that Fifth Amendment specifically
recognizes rights to life, liberty, and property); see also R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law
Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court. Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Rep-
resented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1051, 1067 (1995) (pointing
to specific rights named in First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process
Clause); Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for "Earth-
bound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 29, 29 (1992) (noting that under natural law theory,
relevant moral principles should be derived from critical interpretations of Constitution
and tradition).
121. See R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court:
Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall,
26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1051, 1080 (1995) (claiming that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Sou-
ter employ natural law approach).
122. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (describing human law as pro-
ceeding from natural law), excerpted in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 46
(Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans. W.W. Norton & Co. 1988) (1273); see also Randy E. Bar-
nett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12
CONST. COMMENTARY 93, 108 n.42 (1995) (positing that natural rights are pregovern-
mental). For example, whereas Kelso believes O'Connor derives natural law principles
only from the Constitution, I believe that like Brennan, O'Connor is willing to venture
beyond that document to some "higher law" when the Constitution does not define its
terms. Kelso's quote from O'Connor illustrates this assertion:
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.... The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives
and her place in society.
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992)). That other Justices have developed decidedly different definitions of liberty sug-
gests that Justice O'Connor has resorted to some other source for her definition. Interest-
ingly, O'Connor's definition is not unlike Brennan's, which included "freedom from bodily
restraint or inspection; freedom of choice in basic decisions of life; and autonomous control
over the development and expression of one's intellect and personality." Memo from Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice Douglas (Dec. 30, 1971), in KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE
FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA
224 (1993).
appropriate definition of natural rights is provided by Professor
Randy Barnett:
Natural rights are the set of concepts that define the moral space
within which persons must be free to make their own decisions and
live their own lives; they entail enforceable claims on other persons;
they are natural because their necessity depends upon the nature of
persons and the social and physical world in which persons reside.123
According to Barnett, natural rights theory directs us to the ques-
tion of what moral space or jurisdiction individuals need in order to
pursue the "good life."' 24
To critics, perhaps the most disturbing aspect of natural law/nat-
ural rights theory is the notion that an immoral law, a law in viola-
tion of natural law, is no law at all.125 The possibility that natural-
law Justices might ignore the positive law on the basis of their per-
ceptions that the positive law is unjust arouses criticism from natu-
ral-law opponents. These opponents argue that a determination of
what comports with natural law rests on judgments that are hope-
lessly subjective. 26
Justice Brennan admitted that some subjectivity in the interpre-
tation of the law was unavoidable and necessary.12 7 Indeed, Bren-
123. Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 93, 106 (1995); see also Helen K. Michael,
The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contem-
plate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 421-25
(1991) (arguing that Framers contemplated unenumerated natural rights not limited to
Constitution).
124. Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 93, 108 (1995) (explaining that natural law
assesses propriety of individual conduct).
125. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (concluding that law which dif-
fers from natural law is corruption of law), excerpted in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS
AND ETHICS 53 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1988) (1273). This idea
was taken up by Martin Luther King, Jr., as the rally cry of the passive resistance move-
ment against racial discrimination. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham
Jail (insisting that "one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws"), reprinted in 26
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 840 (1993). King defined an unjust law as "any law that degrades
human personality." Id.; cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (contending that death penalty is unconstitutional because it is degrading to
human dignity).
126. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1959) (advocating importance of maintaining defined, objective
standards).
127. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
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nan's approach, along with his willingness to resort to notions of a
"higher" societal good, reflects an adherence to natural law princi-
ples. Brennan once said that when the community's interpretation
of a constitutional provision departs from the provision's "essential
meaning," a Justice is bound by a "larger duty" to the community
to point out the discrepancy.12 8  Brennan's response to a higher
calling and a more transcendent good was reflected in his jurispru-
dence. For example, in Furman v. Georgia,'129 both Brennan and
Marshall argued that national consensus was (or, in Marshall's
view, would be if the public were adequately informed) against the
death penalty.130 When confronted with evidence to the contrary,
Brennan asserted in Gregg v. Georgia13 1 that he would continue to
oppose the death penalty on the principle that the punishment de-
graded human dignity, a proposition which was largely derived
from natural rights theory.13 2
Brennan understood that natural law was not mere reliance on a
given Justice's personal view and thus supported the widely ac-
cepted position that a judge cannot solely rely on his or her per-
sonal views when making judicial decisions. 133 Unlike Marshall,
who showed little sign of utilizing any version of natural law inter-
pretation or reliance on transcendent values,3 Brennan explicitly
and approvingly discussed natural law in his opinions. 35 In addi-
128. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 437 (1986).
This idea presumes that the judicial branch is somehow superior to the people in arriving at
a correct understanding of the Constitution.
129. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
130. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that death pen-
alty has been almost totally rejected by society). Marshall shared Brennan's view of social
consensus against the death penalty. See id at 360-61 (Marshall, J., concurring) (deeming
death penalty unacceptable to United States citizens, and arguing that punishment is cruel
and unusual if informed people find it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable).
131. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
132. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 230-31 (opposing death penalty as violative of human
dignity).
133. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 433, 434-35 (1986) (commenting that Justices are not selected
to make law based on their personal beliefs).
134. Of course, we know Marshall believed in the natural rights upheld by the Consti-
tution and Declaration of Independence. Here, I am merely suggesting that Marshall did
not stray from an admittedly expansive reading of the Constitution, supported by his no-
tion of national consensus, in upholding those rights.
135. See Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and
the Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 663 (1995)
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tion to reading St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica in prepa-
ration for his now famous concurring opinion in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 36 Brennan spoke about principles
derived from the natural law tradition.137 Brennan set forth his
views on judicial interpretation in a revealing speech made near
the end of his career in which he advocated combining "reason"
and "passion" to arrive at correct decisions.138 Brennan defined
"passion" as "reasoned reflection" on the humanity present in a
given fact situation, and he stated that "[o]nly by remaining open
to the entreaties of reason and passion, of logic and of experience,
can a judge come to understand the complex human meaning of a
rich term such as 'liberty,' and only with such understanding can
courts fulfill their constitutional responsibility to protect that
value.' 1 39 This method of deliberation mirrors that described by
writers, such as Aquinas and Locke, of an individual arriving at a
determination of "the law."' 40 Brennan also argued that courts do
not, contrary to the view of positivists, "declare" law; rather, they
derive it from "legal principles."'' For Brennan, perhaps more
(stating Brennan's death penalty jurisprudence was "openly aspirational," while Marshall
worked more in instrumentalist tradition); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 395-96 (1985) (suggesting that Marshall's death
penalty jurisprudence saw moral rights as created by convention rather than as natural,
"real" rights).
136. 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 184 (1993) (referencing Brennan's deference to
theory of Aquinas and to view that Constitution was "a living, breathing document").
138. See id. (proposing, "As Aquinas had written that knowledge arises from reason,
it was reason and fairness, not precedent and law, that would dictate Brennan's
jurisprudence").
139. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 3, 11 (1988).
140. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (describing process of deter-
mining law through "practical reason"), excerpted in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS
AND ETHICS 48-49 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1988) (1273); JOHN
LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE 199 (Robert Horwitz et al., eds.,
1990) (contending that individuals must deduce law of nature from natural principles be-
cause law of nature cannot be derived by consensus); see also Michael Mello, Adhering to
Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punish-
ment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 662 (1995) (stating, "The human faculty of reason plays a
central role in natural law philosophy").
141. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law", 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 15 (1988) (observing that legal principles were placed in form of
written Constitution to ensure they were heeded).
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consciously than for Marshall, those principles embodied a kind of
morality. 4 2 Like natural law theorists, Brennan failed to see a
sharp distinction between positive law and morality. 143 Moreover,
Brennan was willing to move beyond the standard list of natural
rights provided in the Declaration of Independence in order to de-
fine a principle by which such rights can be identified.144 Brennan's
decisions, as one biographer has noted, "ranged through the ages
and the centuries in search of truth.' '1 45
In addition, Brennan explicitly embraced St. Thomas Aquinas's
ideology, as he understood it. In a 1985 speech, Brennan noted a
jurisprudential "return to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aqui-
nas. "146 In Aquinas, Brennan saw a mandate to see "things whole"
and to look at the entire human situation when determining the
law.147 This is somewhat of an extrapolation from Aquinas, who
theorized about making determinations of the law on an individual,
reflective basis.' 48 Nonetheless, Brennan's speech implicitly ac-
knowledges his opinion that a judge must consider the good of hu-
manity in interpreting the law. 49 This concern with the common
good in interpreting the law reflects Brennan's consideration of
natural rights principles.
Although Marshall shared Brennan's liberal goals for society, he
did not agree with the notion that such goals could be achieved
142. See Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and
the Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 652 (1995)
(stating that in death penalty cases Brennan believed prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment embodied moral standard but that intrinsic morality of Amendments con-
trolled rather than strict percepts of conventional morality theory).
143. See Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 2393, 2394 (1992) (proposing that moral theory is natural law theory and that moral
principles are objectively valid and discoverable by reason).
144. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (viewing death penalty as
being unconstitutional because it degrades human dignity).
145. KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 184 (1993).
146. William J. Brennan, Jr., How Goes the Supreme Court?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 781,
787-88 (1985).
147. Id. at 788-89.
148. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (relating determination of
human law to individual reason applied to natural law principles), excerpted in ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 55 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1988) (1273).
149. See id. (describing unjust law as one that is contrary to human good or one that is
contrary to divine will).
[Vol. 29:1
1997] ESSAY
through an appeal to what is morally or absolutely right. Marshall
emphatically denied going beyond the legal text to make law. 150
Indeed, if one accepts the argument that there is no "standard"
reading of the Constitution, Marshall can be taken at his word.
The jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall reflects a remarkable con-
fidence that the Constitution is broad enough to cure the country's
ills if it were to be fully enacted by the Supreme Court.151 Mar-
shall's view that the Constitution was "defective from the start"
does not contradict this notion.1 52 Marshall saw the Constitution as
evolving, having been improved by amendment, a civil war, and
social change. 3 To Marshall, the Constitution was a document
which, if kept to its word, could bring about further change. 154
While Marshall never explicitly discussed natural law theory, he
appeared to dismiss its implications on at least three occasions, in
each case writing apart from Brennan. 55  By separating himself
from natural law theory, Marshall exhibited a distrust of morality-
based decision-making, whether utilized to arrive at conservative
or liberal results. For example, writing a separate concurrence
150. See Linda S. Greene, The Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the United
States Supreme Court, 6 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 27, 34 (1989) (responding to Senator Er-
vin during nomination hearings that he would consult "the law, precedents and facts to
decide the case."). Marshall apparently did not conceive of any "human rights" beyond
those explicit or implicit in the Constitution. He said, "The goal of a true democracy ... is
that any baby born in these United States ... is, merely by being born and drawing his first
breath in this democracy, endowed with the exact same rights as a child born to a Rockefel-
ler." Thurgood Marshall, Address at the Annual Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 5,
1986), in 115 F.R.D. 349, 354 (1987) (emphasis added).
151. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 5 (1994) (relating contents of speech by Marshall
demonstrating his faith in ability of Constitution to evoke change, stating that "[y]ou'll
never find another Constitution like this one.").
152. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (relaying Marshall's view that Constitution was being
cited for propositions not intended by Framers). In one case Marshall sternly speaks of the
Constitution "as interpreted by this Court" as permitting two hundred years of discrimina-
tion against African-Americans. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Con-
stitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (relating Marshall's opinion that Constitution's
meaning is not 'fixed').
154. See James 0. Freedman, Thurgood Marshall: Man of Character, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1487, 1489 (1994) (stating Marshall was idealist who believed in promise of Declara-
tion of Independence, in rule of law, and in inability of government to improve social
conditions).
155. See infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
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from Brennan that Georgia's death penalty laws were unconstitu-
tional, Marshall argued in Furman v. Georgia156 that "at times a cry
is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence a society's
abhorrence of [a criminal] act. But the Eighth Amendment is our
insulation from our baser selves."'1 57 Clearly, Marshall saw the dan-
ger of relying on one version or another of "morality" or "truth" to
decide the law.158 Similarly, in Colgrove v. Battin,159 Marshall re-
jected the majority's holding, in a decision written by Brennan, that
the demands of the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial are
met when a federal-court jury in a civil proceeding is comprised of
only six members.16 ° Marshall argued strenuously that this deci-
sion was based on "nothing more solid than the intuitive, unex-
plained sense of five Justices that a certain line is 'right' or
'just.""' 161 When constitutional rights are based on such "intuition,"
he asserted, those rights are certain to erode.'62 The insistence that
rules must be made and kept and that fact-specific distinctions
would only dilute principles designed to protect criminal defend-
ants is a recurring theme in Marshall's jurisprudence. 63
Marshall launched a similar attack against the majority's reason-
ing in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center164 in which he
challenged the majority's assertion that the mentally retarded were
156. 408 U.S. 238 (1973).
157. Furman, 408 U.S. at 344-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
158. Id. Interestingly, Marshall also argued in Furman that social consensus supports
the end of the death penalty. Id. This is not as contradictory as it may seem considering
that Marshall spoke of an adequately informed consensus. See infra notes 168-82 and ac-
companying text.
159. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
160. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 159-60.
161. Id. at 181.
162. Id. Marshall allied himself with the absolutist jurisprudence of Hugo Black, ar-
guing that constitutional rights that are subject to "pressures of the moment" are not really
protected at all. Id. at 181-82. As with Marshall, Brennan occasionally clashed with Black
over Brennan's willingness to balance and negotiate rights which Black deemed to be abso-
lute. See Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three Ring Circus Six Years Later, 25 STETSON L. REV. 81,
122 n.5 (1995) (discussing Brennan's opposition to Black's absolutism with respect to First
Amendment protections).
163. See Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice
Marshall's View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369 passim (1994) (discussing
Marshall's recurring preference for clear-cut rules to override effects of fallible fact-finding
process).
164. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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not a suspect classification. 165 Marshall denied the implication be-
hind the Court's rigid three-tiered classification system for equal
protection jurisprudence that absolute rights and wrongs could be
fixed at one point in history for all generations. In fact, Marshall
argued that the Court should heed society's evolving standards of
right and wrong rather than rely on moral absolutes.166
In this opinion, Marshall demonstrates not only a distrust of mo-
rality-based judgments, but he rejects a major implication of natu-
ral law theory that the justness of a law is to be determined by an
individual upon reasoned reflection. 167 Instead, Marshall believed
that an evolving Constitution could be properly interpreted by a
well-informed consensus. That view stemmed from his training in
and lifelong adherence to the social engineering jurisprudence of
Charles Hamilton Houston.
B. Marshall and Legal Realism/Social Engineering
The term most frequently associated with Thurgood Marshall's
career as a lawyer and as a judge is "social engineering.' 1 68 Alone,
this term does not tell us how Marshall derived his view of the law.
However, the "social engineering" philosophy that Marshall was
schooled in as a law student is a version of Legal Realism, which
identifies emerging social consensus as a source of new constitu-
tional interpretation and, therefore, new law.1 69
165. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-64 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
166. See id. at 466 (arguing that constitutional principles evolve over time regardless
of moral debates about absolute wrongs); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 14 (1994)
(quoting Marshall as arguing during early segregation case: "What's at stake here is more
than the rights of my clients; it's the moral commitment stated in our country's creed")
(emphasis added).
167. See JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE 125 (Robert
Horwitz et al., eds., 1990) (considering natural law notion that "[m]an, should he make use
of his reason and native faculties with which he is provided by nature, can arrive at knowl-
edge of this law without a teacher to instruct him; without a tutor to teach him his duty").
168. See James 0. Freedman, Thurgood Marshall: Man of Character, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1487, 1491 (1994) (crediting Charles Hamilton Howard with teaching Marshall that
lawyers are social engineers); Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO.
L.J. 2109, 2119 (1992) (recognizing Houston's influence in Marshall's idea of law as means
of social engineering).
169. But see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience,
72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 751-52 (1992) (noting that Marshall was unconcerned with questions
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Legal realism supplied the theoretical underpinnings for the ju-
risprudence of Charles Hamilton Houston, vice-dean of Howard
Law School and Thurgood Marshall's teacher and mentor. Hous-
ton believed his mission at Howard was to teach young African-
Americans to use the law to battle discrimination. 70 To accom-
plish this goal, Houston proposed to teach his students: (1) to an-
ticipate and guide group advancement; (2) to recognize that a
written Constitution provides ample material for social experimen-
tation; (3) to use the law as a tool for minorities; and (4) to win
cases and influence public opinion on broad principles. 7 '
Marshall learned these lessons well. Perhaps more than Bren-
nan, Marshall embodied Pound's idea that the goal of law was jus-
tice and that one should look to the results of a law to see if justice
had been done. 7 2 As Mark Tushnet indicated, having combined
his experience as a trial lawyer with his adherence to legal realism,
Marshall believed that once you found a solution to a problem you
of constitutional theory). Nonetheless, Marshall responded to some theoretical stances of
his associate Justices. See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
170. See Genna Rae McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston: 1895-1950, 32 How. L.J.
469, 472 (1989) (articulating that Houston taught students to use law as instrument for
minorities "to adopt direct action to achieve [their] place in the community and nation").
171. See id. (discussing Houston's view of lawyers as social engineers). Houston ar-
ticulated a set of principles that appear to have been derived from natural law: (1) the law
is only supreme insofar as it covers the most forgotten individuals; (2) human beings are
equally entitled to the guarantees of the Declaration of Independence; and (3) a good
system of government guarantees freedom and Justice for all its citizens while guaranteeing
more and better opportunities for future generations. See id. at 475 (discussing moral juris-
prudential principles).
172. See ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE
FOR ALL 71 (1992) (discussing Marshall's predisposition to doctrine of Pound which em-
phasized "law-making and also the interpretation of legal rules, to take more account ... of
the social facts upon which the law must proceed and to which it is to be applied"); Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 613-15 (1908) (criticizing devel-
opment of law because "legislation has not expressed social standards adequately," and
giving examples of "the failure of our case law to rise to social and legal emergencies").
But see Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-32 (1943)
(illustrating Pound's willingness to consider competing interest groups and make adjust-
ments in contrast to Marshall). In comparison to Marshall, Brennan shared Pound's prag-
matism. See Beau James Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism
and Predictability in Constitutional Adjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623, 629 (1991) (stating
that Brennan advocated pragmatic source of analysis that evolved from jurisprudence of
Pound).
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had also found the law. 173 Like Houston, Marshall stressed the im-
portance of community and public opinion as sources for legal
change. For instance, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,174 Marshall argued eloquently that the Supreme Court
must be responsive to the people's new demands for justice as re-
flected in legislation passed by their elected representatives,
stating:
Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns at times come to make
past practices appear inconsistent with fundamental principles upon
which American society rests, an inconsistency legally cognizable
under the Equal Protection Clause .... When that occurs, courts
should look to such change as the source of guidance on evolving
principles of equality.175
Merely observing that Marshall looked to consensus in interpret-
ing the law states the matter too simply. As Marshall would argue
in his separate concurrence in Furman v. Georgia 7 6 and in his dis-
sent in Gregg v. Georgia,'" social engineering requires an educated
and informed consensus. 78 Thus, part of the work of an attorney
or Supreme Court Justice, trained as a social engineer, was to edu-
cate the citizenry. 179 That education would include propounding a
Constitution that supports broad social changes.
173. See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2119
(1992) (discussing influence of Marshall's experience as trial lawyer on his later
jurisprudence).
174. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
175. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
176. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
177. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
178. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (reiterating view from concurring opinion in Furman
that well-educated public would reject death penalty so it is unconstitutional); Furman, 408
U.S. at 360 (emphasizing value of consensus among informed people).
179. Like Marshall, Brennan recognized that judges should invoke community inter-
pretations of the law. See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
427, 437 (1986) (propounding that judges should look to community's interpretation when
construing text of Constitution). As Marshall's and Brennan's comments regarding public
sentiment towards the death penalty indicate, however, Marshall was more committed to
the notion that the electorate should be actively informed. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at
231 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (denouncing death penalty as degrading to human dignity
and, therefore, unconstitutional notwithstanding public sentiment in favor of it), with id. at
232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that public opinion will differ greatly depending on
public awareness of effects and consequences of death penalty).
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Educating the public would require focusing on the humanity
underlying the law and setting out in articulate and sometimes im-
passioned language the context and consequences of a judicial de-
cision. More than any other Supreme Court Justice, Marshall
understood this dialectic-the simultaneous turning to the consen-
sus of society to find the law and educating society so that it
reaches an informed consensus. He relied on many tools to negoti-
ate this dialectic; perhaps the most famous is his use of scientific or
sociological data.180 Equally important and magnificent were the
personal, human details he included in his decisions and dissents. 18 1
Marshall's stories, said Brennan, caused his fellow Justices to "con-
front walks of life we had never known.' '1
82
C. From Theory to Practice: Judicial Pragmatism v. Standing on
Principle
The search for a Justice's jurisprudential philosophy is compli-
cated by the unavoidable facts of high-court decision making.
Opinions do not and cannot spring solely from the mind of their
author. Rather, they are collaborative efforts that attempt to re-
flect a consensus and to avoid matters on which there is no consen-
sus. The extent to which a Justice is able to work within this system
has traditionally been some measure of his or her success on the
Court. The best way to describe how Brennan and Marshall indi-
vidually fared in this process is to look at what each had to say
about the other. Hinting at Brennan's ability to establish a consen-
sus, Marshall once noted that no one could persuade as well as
180. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-63 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (relying on social data to demonstrate historical discrimination against
mentally retarded); Furman, 408 U.S. at 360 passim (drawing on vast array of sociological
study to argue death penalty is unconstitutional).
181. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 101 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting ma-
jority's notion that temporary loss of income is never irreparable injury considering
difficulties of average persons in providing themselves "with the essentials of life"); United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (chastising Court for averring that $2 per week was
not great deal of money to poor family).
182. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 23, 31 (1991), reprinted in ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MAR-
SHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 20 (1992).
[Vol. 29:1
ESSAY
Brennan.183 Perhaps thinking of Marshall's refusal to join a major-
ity which he did not absolutely agree with, Brennan said of Mar-
shall, "He was a stickler for the honest truth. 18
4
Brennan mastered consensus-building. Having learned early on
the consequences of taking extreme positions in his decisions185
and failing to take into consideration the views of his more con-
servative brethren,18 6 Brennan developed a skill that was to charac-
terize his jurisprudence until the Rehnquist Court: the skill of
mediating. As Eisler notes, Brennan's career on the Court was not
to be "a profile in courage," nor would he be known as a great
dissenter. 87 Instead, Brennan was an accommodationist. 8 8 In his
first years on the Court, this ability would put Brennan in the posi-
tion of having to accommodate two groups: the absolutists and the
conservativists. Justices Black and Douglas were absolutists who
believed that the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights must be
absolutely guaranteed with no weighing of interests.189 Standing in
opposition were the more conservative Justices, Tom Clark and
Potter Stewart. In many of Brennan's most famous decisions, he
found ways to accommodate these competing interests. 190 For this
reason, Brennan has been called a judicial pragmatist by some ob-
183. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 237
(1995) (referring to Brennan's persuasive ability and remarking that Brennan could sit
down and talk through issues to gather consensus).
184. Id. at 278.
185. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957) (holding that in federal
criminal proceeding government must turn over relevant documents to accused prior to
review by judge for determination of admissibility). Not only did Brennan's decision in
Jencks create great public furor, resulting in the passage of the Jencks Act to overturn the
decision, but it also alienated the most conservative members of the Court from Brennan.
KiM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 132-38 (1993).
186. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND
THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 137 (1993) (revealing Brennan's regret
over failure to address concerns of other Justices in Jencks).
187. See id. at 13 (positing that Brennan's secret to success on Court was that he was
"accommodationist").
188. Id.
189. See id. at 120-21 (stating that Black and Douglas believed in absolute guarantee
of constitutional rights).
190. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text. But see Edward V. Heck, Justice
Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 841,
849-50 (1980) (noting that when Court had solid liberal voting bloc, Brennan was not as
inclined to compromise).
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servers.' 91 For example, in the voting apportionment case of Baker
v. Carr,192 Brennan wrote a decision giving state citizens access to
federal courts to complain of unfair apportionment, rather than es-
tablishing the one-man-one-vote rule, in order to meet Justice
Stewart's objections. 193 As Eisler points out, Brennan was able to
build on that success and eventually pronounce the rule in
Baker.194 Similarly, in New York Times v. Sullivan,195 Brennan was
able to find a free-speech formula in the form of the "actual malice
test" for libel cases that was palatable to a majority of the Jus-
tices.196 Furthermore, in order to appease Justice Stewart, Brennan
dropped a portion of his opinion in Irvin v. Dowd' 97 that would
have allowed federal courts to release state prisoners held in viola-
tion of their federal rights regardless of whether those prisoners
had exhausted state-court remedies, and simply held that the peti-
tioner had actually exhausted all available remedies. 98 While this
decision did not eliminate the exhaustion rule as Brennan had
wanted, it resolved the case in favor of the petitioner without
strengthening the rule. 199
191. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 118
(1995) (observing that as pragmatist Brennan knew importance of winning five votes).
192. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
193. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 175
(1995) (detailing that Black wanted to write Baker decision, but Chief Justice Warren as-
signed opinion to Brennan believing newer Justice would write decision that would win
majority, while absolutist Black would not). Brennan, though, was not always averse to
Black's position. In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), a case "that bol-
stered Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination," Justice Harlan insisted on
writing the opinion so as to limit the decision to the facts before the Court. Id. Brennan
concurred only in the holding, agreeing with Black that the decision should be expanded.
Id. at 123-24.
194. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND
THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 175 (1993) (indicating that Brennan "an-
nounced the dramatic decision of the Court" that forever changed nature of politics in
America). But see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992) (overruling deliberate
by-pass standard pronounced in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)).
195. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
196. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 230-31
(1995) (explaining "actual malice test" articulated by Brennan which drew "unanimous
decision in favor of the Times," but which drew some criticism from Justices Black, Doug-
las, and Goldberg).
197. 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
198. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 159-60
(1995) (discussing formation of Brennan's opinion in Dowd).
199. See id. at 161 (noting that exhaustion rule was not strongly affirmed by Court's
decision).
Scholars have not always looked favorably on Brennan's gift for
conciliation. One commentator has suggested that when the Court
"seemed hopelessly split" on an issue, Brennan wrote opinions
based on "narrow, sometimes technical grounds" in order to secure
a majority vote.20  Brennan has also been accused of being reluc-
tant to take a stand on the issue of liberty under the Due Process
Clause.20 1 Additionally, liberal critics have charged that Brennan's
tendency to balance interests rather than adopt Justice Black's ab-
solutist views has allowed both abuses and curtailment of First
Amendment freedoms.20 2 Furthermore, because of Brennan's abil-
ity to see all sides of an issue, some have complained that his deci-
sions are unclear.2 13  "He made mistakes," wrote biographer
Hunter R. Clark, "and in his haste to conciliate, forge consensus,
and keep from burning bridges he may have minimized unpleasant
realities. 20 4
Marshall sometimes criticized Brennan's failure to squarely de-
cide the law. Marshall did not possess Brennan's skills at concilia-
tion. Although he became the fourth member of one of the
strongest liberal voting blocs in the Court's history2 5 and allied
himself early and firmly with Brennan, he never developed-or ap-
peared to want to develop-a flair for compromise.20 6 If Bren-
nan's first term on the Court taught him the danger of going too far
in propounding extremist views, Marshall's first years taught him
the danger of compromise. In Marshall's early years on the Court,
200. Stephen J. Friedman, William Brennan, Jr., in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978, at 2849, 2852 (Leon Friedman & Frank L. Israel eds.,
1980).
201. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 221-23
(1995) (revealing that Brennan urged co-Justices not to directly address certain issues of
liberty under Due Process Clause because such issues would be imminently addressed by
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which would soon be passed).
202. See id. at 280 (complaining that Brennan's rejection of Black's absolutism al-
lowed First Amendment freedoms to be restricted and abused).
203. See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liber-
alism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 883 (1980) (finding that Brennan's ability to envision
both parties' arguments sometimes led to his developing obscure guidelines).
204. HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 282 (1995).
205. See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liber-
alism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 872 (1980) (discussing liberal voting bloc of Warren
Court). The other members of this bloc were Justices Fortas, Warren, and Brennan. Id.
206. Cf A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105
HARV. L. REV. 55, 65 (1991) (praising Justice Marshall for consistently challenging seem-
ingly immutable injustices in society).
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he participated in some of the cases that set limits on the Fourth
Amendment's mandate against warrantless searches.2 °7 In the
1972 case of Adams v. Williams, °8 Marshall expressed regret for
joining those decisions and revealed some of the rationale behind
his subsequent absolutist jurisprudence in the Fourth Amendment
arena:
While I took the position then [in Terry v. Ohio] that we were not
watering down rights, but were hesitantly and cautiously striking a
necessary balance between the rights of American citizens to be free
from government intrusion into their privacy and their government's
urgent need for a narrow exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment .... It seems that the delicate balance...
was simply too delicate, too susceptible to the "hydraulic pressures"
of the day. As a result of today's decision, the balance struck in
Terry is now heavily weighted in favor of the government. And the
Fourth Amendment, which was included in the Bill of Rights to pre-
vent the kind of arbitrary and police action involved herein, is dealt a
serious blow. Today's decision invokes the specter of a society in
which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched, and arrested at
the whim of police officers who have only the slightest suspicion of
improper conduct.2"9
According to one biographer, Marshall lost faith in the Court's
ability to balance private and government needs after Adams and
dissented in decisions that made exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirements.210 Such steadfast adherence to the
rule of law as he viewed it was a hallmark of Marshall's jurispru-
dence. 211 According to Tushnet, Marshall's views on matters about
which he most cared were so firm that he saw little point in trying
207. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (allowing brief warrantless searches in
interest of police safety).
208. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
209. Adams, 407 U.S. at 161-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. See ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE
FOR ALL 242-43 (1992) (recognizing Marshall's subsequent refusal to permit exceptions to
warrant and probable cause requirements once he decided he could not balance citizens'
privacy against government needs).
211. See William W. Fisher, III, The Jurisprudence of Justice Marshall, 6 HARV.
BLACKLETTER J. 131, 131 (1989) (distinguishing characteristics of Marshall's jurispru-
dence: pursuit of a substantive conception of justice; Legal Realist view on abstraction;
generalization and doctrine; and devotion to rule of law).
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to influence the other Justices's opinions.2"2 This was an approach
that Brennan had little patience for. According to Hunter R.
Clark, Brennan had become disillusioned with Marshall near the
end of their joint tenure, and he felt that Marshall had not tried
hard enough to compromise while on the Supreme Court.213
Marshall often avoided compromise when he felt the Court had
refused to adopt acceptably clear standards. Marshall's experience
as a trial lawyer taught him the importance of a need for clear stan-
dards.214 First, clear standards made it relatively easy for lower
court judges to arrive at their decisions.21 5 Second, they provided
predictability and consistency, both essential when litigating civil
rights cases in a country where you never knew the racial politics of
the judge before whom you were arguing. 16 Third, as noted previ-
ously, the respect given to the current set of standards would also
have to be given to any set of standards a good lawyer was able to
replace them with. Finally, standards kept lower court judges from
rampant and dangerous exercises of judicial discretion.
Brennan, by contrast, particularly in his years on the Court prior
to its radical shift to the right, was inclined to balance interests, to
negotiate holdings with his fellow Justices and to arrive at less-
than-certain and often fact-specific results. When disagreeing with
212. See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2129
(1992) (finding that Marshall's views were so liberal and definitive that his attempts to
influence other Justices was pointless).
213. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 274
(1995) (commenting that Brennan viewed Marshall as highly intelligent but uninterested in
debating many matters before Court).
214. See Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice
Marshall's View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 401 (1994) (writing that
Marshall believed "the rights the Supreme Court so carefully described would remain
meaningless in the absence of clearly enunciated procedures to ensure that rights were
known and enforceable"). Marshall's recommended standards were not always better de-
fined than those of the majority. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v.
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 293 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that constitutional
right of government employer to decide whether to make decisions in public arena varies
with "the nature of the decision at issue and the institutional environment in which it must
be made").
215. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 164 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for ambiguous interpretation of requirements of
Freedom of Information Act because lower courts would have to guess how to proceed).
216. See Stricklnad v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707-08 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (condemning majority's application of "standard of reasonableness" in questions in-
volving effective assistance of counsel for telling attorneys "almost nothing" and calling for
"more detailed standards").
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Brennan, Marshall willingly pointed out this tendency. One exam-
ple is Marshall's dissent to Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,217 a plurality decision with five separate opin-
ions, written just three years after Marshall came to the Court. In
Rosenbloom, Brennan wrote that when a private individual sues a
media outlet for libel for conveying a story involving an event of
public or general interest, the plaintiff must prove actual malice
even if the defendant is not a public figure.218 Dissenting, Marshall
argued that Brennan's standard was so inexact that it could poten-
tially damage the interests of both private individuals and the
press.219 In response to the Court's failure to provide lower courts
with guidelines by which to determine whether or not a subject is
of public concern, Marshall noted that any topic could qualify, in-
cluding one as intimate as the use of contraceptives. 220 Further-
more, the Court's decision required lower court judges to engage in
ad hoc balancing of the interests of private individuals and the me-
dia. Such balancing, Marshall believed, "is achieved at a substan-
tial cost in predictability and certainty."' 221 Brennan, who had
compromised his way to the decision in the underlying case of New
York Times v. Sullivan,222 responded to these concerns with charac-
teristic optimism about the ability of the lower court to apply the
law by stating that "[w]e do not ... share the doubts of our Broth-
ers Harlan and Marshall that courts would be unable to identify
interests in privacy and dignity. The task may be difficult but not
more so than other tasks in this field. 223
Marshall also argued, in a separate concurrence, that the Court's
opinion in Batson v. Kentucky224 would fail because it did not es-
217. 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
255 (1964) (delineating actual malice standard).
219. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing nebulous
standard proposed by Brennan).
220. See id. (asserting that potential danger exists for intimate matters of private indi-
viduals to be exposed publicly because Court failed to provide guidelines for lower courts
to determine scope of public concern).
221. Id. at 81.
222. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
223. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 49 n.17.
224. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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tablish a bright-line rule for lower courts to follow. 2 25 In Batson,
the Court held that peremptory juror challenges made solely on
the basis of race were unconstitutional.226 Marshall argued in con-
ference that determining whether a peremptory challenge had, in
fact, been made on the basis of race would be nearly impossible
and advocated the wholesale abolishment of preemptories.227 In a
memo to Brennan, Marshall wrote, "I continue to believe the ma-
jority's approach will by its nature be ineffective in ending racial
discrimination in the use of preemptories. I see no reason to be
gentle in pointing that out, and I doubt that pulling my punches
now would make the situation any better. 228
In Marshall's rare differences with Brennan, Marshall occasion-
ally argued for a more "conservative" result. These differences
often occurred over procedural matters. 229 For example, the Jus-
tices differed throughout their joint tenure over the meaning and
scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Marshall believed that both the Eleventh Amendment,
and, by implication, Article III of the Constitution prevented state
citizens from suing their resident states in federal court absent con-
225. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that Court's fail-
ure to entirely ban preemptories created potential for ongoing discrimination in jury
selection).
226. Id. at 86.
227. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM 338 (1990) (requesting
complete ban of preemptories for both parties because of difficulty detecting racially moti-
vated juror strikes).
228. Id. Brennan replied: "I am not yet ready to decide that peremptory challenges
must be eliminated in order to cure the discriminatory use of those challenges and and [sic]
for that reason do not join you." Id. Marshall expressed a similar dissent in Texas v. Mc-
Cullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986), a decision in which Brennan concurred. In that decision,
Marshall protested the Court's holding that the imposition of a stricter sentence after a
new trial than that given after the first trial was not presumptively vindictive where the trial
judge had personally granted the new trial. See McCullough, 475 U.S. at 150 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (urging a bright-line rule of presumptive vindictiveness whenever greater sen-
tence was imposed, even if new trial had been ordered by judge); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (objecting to ambiguity of
majority's standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel to which Brennan
concurred).
229. See American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 277-79 (1980) (holding
that case satisfied finality requirement and thus Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear it).
Marshall disagreed with Brennan's holding in this case. See id. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing decision below was not final and Court thus lacked jurisdiction).
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sent or congressional override. 23° Brennan, on the other hand,
consistently dissented from the Court's Eleventh Amendment ju-
risprudence, arguing strenuously that the amendment precluded
from federal court suits brought against states by citizens of other
states.231 Again, this difference can be explained. Brennan clearly
had the textual argument won; the Eleventh Amendment actually
says what Brennan said it does. However, Marshall characteristi-
cally accepted the Court's traditional interpretation of the provi-
sion as well as the long history of that principle.232
Interestingly, while Marshall's dissents from Brennan's decisions
or concurrences were often based on Marshall's perception that the
majority was establishing a weak standard, Brennan most often dis-
sented from Marshall's decisions because of a disagreement with
how a standard should have been applied to a given set of facts. In
Beckwith v. United States,233 Marshall concurred with a majority
holding that statements made by an individual during questioning
by an IRS agent for criminal tax fraud could be admitted even
though the individual had not received the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona.234 Marshall concurred only because the IRS
agent had in fact given the individual a Miranda-like warning
before questioning him.235 Brennan dissented, however, arguing
that Miranda required strict compliance.236 This result may not be
the anomaly it appears to be. Marshall tended to join majority
opinions only when they did not endanger a rule of law in which he
believed.237 With the standard intact, he was free to interpret the
facts as he saw them, as was Brennan. Brennan was more likely
than Marshall to compromise on legal standards, although decreas-
230. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that
state citizens have no constitutional rights to sue state without consent of state or action by
Congress).
231. See id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (interpreting Eleventh Amendment as
absolute bar to any suit against one state by citizen of another state).
232. See id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing history of sovereign immunity
doctrine).
233. 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
234. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
235. Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 348 (Marshall, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
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ingly so in his later years, such that Marshall's disagreements with
him were likely doctrinal.
V. DISTINCTIONS WITHOUT DIFFERENCES? IMPLICATIONS
From this discussion, we can identify the jurisprudential styles of
Justices Brennan and Marshall and assess their philosophical differ-
ences. Both Justices were judicial activists who labored in the tra-
dition of Legal Realism. Both men believed their jobs as part of
the judiciary were to give effect to the purposes of our framing
document and to our statutes in the light of changing needs and
values. Marshall, skeptical of the view that the Constitution is a
"sacred text," rarely went beyond his interpretation of that docu-
ment to find the law.238 Nevertheless, Marshall appealed to social
consensus-either explicitly, stating that his views were supported
by society, or implicitly by "educating" the public through human
facts and details in his decisions and dissents. An informed public,
he believed, would demand more from its framing document.239
Brennan strayed further from the text of the Constitution than
Marshall did. Brennan explicitly and implicitly embraced the natu-
ral rights strand of natural law theory and believed that judges, by
applying reason, could arrive at decisions that furthered the good
of society and upheld human dignity.24 °
These descriptions of Marshall's and Brennan's decision-making
styles present a paradox. On the rare occasions when Brennan and
Marshall differed, they did so because Marshall advocated a hard-
and-fast rule or adherence to an already established rule, while
Brennan was willing to "give" a little to reach a consensus. The
paradox lies here: why should Brennan, an avowed believer in
finding the "right" law, be more likely to yield, and why should
Marshall, who generally avoided natural law considerations, ap-
pear so inflexible?
As this discussion has revealed, this situation is not as paradoxi-
cal as it may seem. Marshall's training in the Legal Realist tradi-
tion and his career as a "social engineer" did not prepare him to
negotiate away precedent he believed to be victories. As Tushnet
238. See supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 127-49 and accompanying text.
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points out, a social engineer needs solid precedent.24' Moreover,
as Marshall stated on several occasions, litigators need a degree of
certainty and predictability. Marshall understood that the paradox
of social engineering was that the law must remain stable long
enough to be attacked, and most of the precedent he strove to pro-
tect represented what he perceived to be legal victories. Thus, ar-
guments for stability by way of rules that lower courts could apply
made sense.
Similarly, Brennan's natural law ideology would not necessarily
lead to an inflexible jurisprudence. The belief that the Constitution
reflects broad, unenumerated goals but that it does not specifically
enumerate all the "natural" rights encompassed by those goals can
in some sense liberate a Justice from a need for hard-and-fast rules.
Such rules are, of course, required by a textualist or originalist ap-
proach to interpretation and perhaps even by a Justice who accepts
the moral rigidity of classical natural law ideology. A natural rights
theorist who either implicitly or explicitly accepts that the Consti-
tution is not the final word on a litigant's rights, sees his or her
foremost duty as protecting those rights for the good of human-
ity.242 The Justice can then view himself or herself as part of an
interpretative process rather than as a declarer of the law. Thus, a
flexible, progressive approach that achieves the goal of upholding
basic human rights would be acceptable to natural rights theorists.
To the extent that a comparison of these Justices' philosophies
with their jurisprudence does present a genuine paradox, this para-
dox is complex. In part, its solution lies in the personal and profes-
sional histories of the Justices. Marshall, one suspects, never lost
his taste for resounding victories in the fight against injustice. As a
civil rights lawyer, he was enormously successful and saw far-reach-
ing results nearly overnight. 43 Things did not happen as quickly
on the Supreme Court. Moreover, Marshall's decisions and dis-
sents often evince a deep distrust of lower court judges, of the sys-
tem, and sometimes of the Supreme Court. His dissent in Adams
241. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 314-15 (1994) (explaining that Marshall believed
by end of his tenure that precedent was necessary to change rule of law).
242. See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 118
(1995) (stating that Brennan compromised on decisions in effort to meet needs of litigants).
243. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
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v. Williams,2" in which he admits that his attempts to allow reason-
able exceptions to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence had resulted
in a watering down of that amendment, demonstrates the depth of
this distrust.24 5 Tushnet notes that Marshall's extreme political
views isolated him on the Supreme Court from the start.246 Be-
cause Marshall could always be expected to take a liberal stance,
Tushnet argues, no Justice on the Court felt he needed to be
"courted. '247 This phenomenon must surely explain Brennan's in-
creased resort to dissent in his later years on the Court, when com-
promise and negotiation became increasingly impossible.
Brennan by all accounts took immediately and intuitively to the
role of judge, and his personality lent itself remarkably to the tradi-
tional give-and-take of a multi-membered court. In some sense,
this was both his failing and his gift. Perhaps a slight weakness in
character, as some have charged, led to weak and difficult-to-apply
decisions. On the other hand, Brennan's "weakness" helped create
some of the greatest changes in the law this century.248 Further-
more, even as he left the Court to an overwhelmingly conservative
majority, Brennan expressed faith in the system's ability to correct
itself and in the precedent he had helped to establish.
In some respects, this faith was misguided. Brennan's gift of
compromise, a gift nearly essential to effective jurisprudence from
an extremist judge, inevitably produced vulnerable precedent. In
this respect, Marshall's occasional criticism of Brennan's decisions
was well-founded. Decisions reached by a majority of five, based
244. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
245. Adams, 407 U.S. at 143; see also Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49, 114 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reflecting Brennan's similar change of heart by renouncing his
earlier attempts to balance interests in First Amendment protections of pornography and
concluding that such attempts resulted in muddled standards).
246. See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2129
(1992) (revealing that soon after his appointment Marshall so consistently dissented that he
exerted little influence on other Justices).
247. Id. at 2129.
248. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1986) (extending protection of First
Amendment to flag burning); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding state could
not deny education to undocumented immigrants); Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1977) (finding tort cause of action to be constitutional against cities and
state subdivisions); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (heightening scrutiny for clas-
sifications based on gender); Stephen Wermeil, Comments Made at Conference, Members
of the Warren Court in Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (1995) (arguing
Brennan's jurisprudence reshaped "doctrinal landscape").
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on arguably vague ideas of rightness and establishing arguably
vague or fact-specific standards, are inherently vulnerable. The
early Rehnquist Court did not disguise its intent to take advantage
of that vulnerability. 249
Marshall's Legal Realist/social engineer attempts to sway the
public and the Court and to educate them as to the rightness of a
particular position did not stop the conservative backlash 250 nor did
his repeated call for standards "with teeth" and for firm adherence
to Warren-Court precedent. Marshall knew this when he stepped
down. His dissent in Payne makes it clear that he knew. But this
awareness could not stop the conservative backlash. One suspects
that the Constitution had "evolved" all it was going to before the
pendulum swung back.
As Tushnet concludes, the liberal dilemma manifested by the
choice between dissent on principle or judicial compromise may be
inevitable. It may be that in a democracy it will nearly always be
the moderate voice, the centrist view, or the majority's interests
that carry the most weight. Brennan and Marshall knew well that
what is moderate, centrist, or in the best interest of the majority
changes, and a society comes to demand different protections from
its government and its founding document. When society once
again catches up, the jurisprudence of Brennan and Marshall will
be there, waiting.
249. See DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST: THE
EARLY YEARS 49-50, 120-21 (1987) (discussing Rehnquist's outspoken opposition to liber-
alism and "excess in terms of constitutional adjudication" of Warren Court decisions).
250. See Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
411, 425 (1981) (stating that in liberal societies, no court can create binding precedent and
that successive courts must decide to be bound).
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